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Written evidence submitted by Dr Laurence Ferry, Durham University1 (EST 07)
I welcome this opportunity to submit written evidence to the Procedure Committee’s inquiry 
on Scrutiny of the Government’s Supply Estimates. This reply draws on my recent published 
academic work on budgeting and governance in public services and senior level personal 
experience of both central government and local government accounting practices. My 
response takes account of that there has already been written evidence submitted to this 
inquiry on comparative contexts (Wehner), international best practice (OECD) and pragmatic 
improvements (Heald). I do not aim to repeat these messages per se, and instead focus more 
specifically on one main theme and derive a number of points accordingly.
The focus of my response is that supply estimates should not be viewed in isolation as a 
stand-alone exercise, but are part of at least three interconnected activities for central 
government budgeting and governance practices i.e. the spending review, budget, and 
accountability and transparency arrangements. For example, the spending review sets out a 
planning framework for income and expenditure levels over the medium term as part of 
multi-year planning (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011). The Conservative government’s spending 
review after 2015, like its forerunners by the Coalition government 2010-2015 and New 
Labour government 1997-2010, is considered to provide a stable framework within which the 
government can plan, construct and implement (in other words ‘constrain’) the annual 
budget. This veneer of stability espoused by the spending review has afforded an external 
legitimation to decision making, whether in a period of growth or recession. 
The annual budget enables detailed policy choices with associated financial impacts and 
implications (Ferry and Eckersley, 2012). The UK government may set its annual budgets 
within the context of multi-year spending reviews, but yet these can be decoupled and indeed 
government has been able to announce policies in the annual budget that sit outside and do 
not breach the spending review framework. This is because the budget can make changes to 
policy, such as through the use of entitlements and transfer of roles to non-state actors, while 
remaining within the spending review’s boundaries. As such, for the executive the budget 
process remains an enabler of changing circumstances to balance annual flexibility with 
1 Dr Laurence Ferry is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Durham University Business School, and a 
Member of the Senior Common Room at University College, Durham University, UK. He holds a PhD in 
Accounting from Warwick Business School and is a Qualified Chartered Public Finance Accountant. Senior 
level experience has been gained from posts held in both central and local government in the UK, and advisory 
roles internationally.
multi-year stability in public spending. As Heald (2012) notably points out, appropriate 
scrutiny of supply estimates is important for transparency.
The accountability and audit arrangements afford assurance and confidence in the use of 
public funds (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015a). While the UK central government has retained its 
approach to setting annual budgets within the context of multi-year spending reviews, and 
scrutiny through the Public Accounts Committee hearings on groundwork by the National 
Audit Office, it has also made significant changes to accountability and audit arrangements 
for local public bodies in England, such as local government, police, fire and the NHS (Ferry 
and Murphy, 2015). Indeed, taking local government as an example, the dismantling of 
institutions such as the Audit Commission and scrapping of performance management 
frameworks and processes that monitored outputs and outcomes for spending, such as public 
service agreements and comprehensive area assessments, meant that top-down accountability 
became focused overwhelmingly on financial conformance rather than organizational 
performance. 
Supplementary reforms that were intended to make up for the reduction in accountability 
arrangements, such as the requirement to increase the transparency of public administration 
through on-line publication of all transactions over £500 by local authorities, and thereby 
enable greater bottom-up accountability with citizens acting as ‘armchair auditors’, have 
resulted in a performance assessment system that is neither as rigorous nor standardized. The 
overall result is a weakening of local accountability arrangements (Eckersley, Ferry and 
Zakaria, 2014; Ferry and Eckersley, 2015a, 2015b; Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 2015). At 
the same time, to address austerity localism pressures the local authorities have become 
focussed on budgetary stewardship by holding down input costs. However, the scale of 
funding cuts means this strategy is unlikely to be successful over the longer term. So, the 
local authorities need greater freedom to generate revenue in order to facilitate innovation 
and develop more sustainable business practices and service models (Ferry, Coombs and 
Eckersley, 2017). In the meantime as they await a promised increase in control over revenue, 
local authorities have begun to enrol citizens more into governance, delivery and funding of 
services through consultation processes, and the grassroots have become more vocal in 
challenging budget decisions (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015).
In addition, during times of uncertainty the central government may also make an emergency 
budget (Ferry and Eckersley, 2012), and undoubtedly regardless of economic climate the 
practices of auditability and risk management now pervades all government activity (Power, 
1997, 1999). Together the overall arrangements address governance, financial conformance 
and performance (Ball, 2012).
From this there can be a number of points made with regards to the public financial 
management system, and especially for scrutiny of supply estimates in the UK. For instance, 
in terms of Members debating estimates, the emphasis has been on audit and accountability 
arrangements at the end of the process with the Public Accounts Committee hearings calling 
upon National Audit Office work. This has been relatively successful in recent years and 
somewhat high profile, but is after the event. More emphasis on scrutiny of estimates should 
also be placed on the front end of the spending review which has been relatively neglected, 
and indeed the budget were entitlements, transfer of roles to non-state actors and opening 
doors through secondary legislation can occur. In addition, the impact and implications 
further down the line at local public bodies and NDPB’s for example has to be better 
understood, and full use should be made of departmental select committees feeding in their 
views.
Scrutiny requires that Members have appropriate documentation and support from House 
departments. Given the complexity of some issues around estimates and their technical nature 
that require expertise and capacity, the delegation of detailed scrutiny of estimates and 
supplementary estimates to departmental select committees makes sense. It is also important 
that these select committees are in turn appropriately supported with research capability and 
capacity, but this is limited and no budget office exists to provide independent analysis for 
financial scrutiny. The effectiveness of financial scrutiny in international comparisons is rated 
as weak (Wehner, 2010). 
Rules and conventions govern the formal consideration of estimates, but these need not be 
universally the same between countries. For the UK, the Executive should continue to have 
overall control of fiscal policy regarding revenue (mainly from taxes) and expenditure 
(spending) so they can be held accountable for the aggregate position of the economy. It is 
also important that Her Majesty’s Treasury, as the Finance Ministry and guardian of the purse 
strings, remains strong. However, this should not be to the extent where it becomes 
overbearing and can dictate to advocates of spending departments policies and priorities in a 
dictatorial fashion. The private government of public money requires pragmatism and 
compromise, and has been part of the culture in the UK government (Heclo and Wildavsky, 
1974). Further complexity now exists and so it is also important to understand the role of the 
devolved parliaments and assemblies, and the move to devolution for combined authorities 
that will not merely be expenditure focussed but will get more control over their revenue 
streams.
The House’s formal procedures for approving estimates and passing supply and appropriation 
bills limit the power of the House for scrutinising estimates. In particular, this is affected by 
the rule whereby the House cannot increase estimates and the limited time from presentation 
of estimates and votes in the House. To improve scrutiny would require reform of procedures 
and timetables, which would have to be part of any comprehensive overhaul of the system.  
The timing and time allocated for the House’s consideration of estimates are both important 
to ensure a robust process. It is common sense that in normal circumstances estimates should 
be passed before the start of a financial year to help ensure fiscal discipline, and it is a 
blemish that this does not happen and so the timings should be reconsidered. In addition, it is 
imperative that checks are in place to ensure time allocated to consider estimates is actually 
used in that way otherwise it may undermine the scrutiny process.
22 April 2016
References
Ahrens, T. & Ferry, L. (2015). Newcastle City Council and the grassroots: Accountability 
and budgeting under austerity. Accounting, Accountability and Auditing Journal 28(6): 909-
933.
Ball, I. (2012). Accounting, transparency and financial stability. Speech at the International 
Federation of Accountants Global Seminar on the Sovereign Debt Crisis, Vienna.
Eckersley, P., Ferry, L. & Zakaria, Z. (2014). A ‘panoptical’ or ‘synoptical’ approach to 
monitoring performance? Local public services in England and the widening accountability 
gap. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 25(6): 529-538.
Ferry, L., Coombs, H. & Eckersley, P. (2017). Budgetary stewardship, innovation and 
working culture: Identifying the missing ingredient in English and Welsh local authorities’ 
recipes for austerity management. Financial Accountability and Management xx(x): xx-xx.
Ferry, L. & Eckersley, P. (2011). Budgeting and governing for deficit reduction in the UK 
public sector: Act one ‘The comprehensive spending review'. Journal of Finance and 
Management in the Public Services 10(1): 14-23.
Ferry, L. & Eckersley, P. (2012). Budgeting and governing for deficit reduction in the UK 
public sector: Act two ‘The annual budget’. Public Money and Management 32(2): 119-126.
Ferry, L. & Eckersley, P. (2015a). Budgeting and governing for deficit reduction in the UK 
public sector: Act three ‘accountability and audit arrangements’. Public Money and 
Management 35(3): 203-210.
Ferry, L. & Eckersley, P. (2015b). Accountability and transparency: A nuanced response to 
Etzioni. Public Administration Review 75(1): 11-12.
Ferry, L., Eckersley, P. & Zakaria, Z. (2015). Accountability and transparency in English 
local government: Moving from ‘matching parts’ to ‘awkward couple’? Financial 
Accountability and Management 31(3): 345-361.
Ferry, L. & Murphy, P. (2015). Financial sustainability, accountability and transparency 
across local public service bodies in England under austerity. Report to National Audit Office 
(NAO).
Heald, D. (2012). Why is transparency about public expenditure so elusive? International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 78(1): 30-49. 
Heclo, H. & Wildavsky, A. (1974). The private government of public money. Sir S. 
Goldman, The Developing System of Public Expenditure Management and Control, 39.
Power, M. (1997). From risk society to audit society. Soziale Systeme 3(1): 3-21.
Power, M. (1999). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Wehner, J. (2010). Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Control. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
